This paper discusses Minnesota's UPA proposal and the political and institutional issues that arose during the application process. The outreach and education process with key stakeholders and lessons learned for future congestion pricing initiatives are also described.
URBAN PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
In 2006 USDOT announced a new grant program called Urban Partnerships Agreements (UPA) under a new national strategy to reduce congestion in major U.S. cities. USDOT announced that it was seeking proposals from metro areas that agree to implement a comprehensive policy response to urban congestion, including (a) a congestion pricing demonstration, (b) enhanced transit services, (c) increased use of telecommuting and flextime scheduling, and (d) advanced technology deployments. The department announced that it would select one to five so-called urban partners, and would support them with available financial resources, regulatory flexibility, and departmental expertise (5) .
This unprecedented program significantly expanded the incentives for states and metropolitan areas to seek federal funds for demonstrating congestion reduction through pricing, a prerequisite for federal funding under the UPA program. Until this point, the Value Pricing Pilot Program established under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users was the only source of federal dollars available as incentives to implement congestion pricing projects. This program has just $11 million a year available for 3-year demonstration grants. Because of an unusual circumstance in which Congress did not earmark projects in the Fiscal Year 2007 transportation appropriations bill, the USDOT leadership was able to direct $1.1 billion in discretionary funding to the UPA program, mostly in transit funds through FTA (Table 1 ).
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Case Study of Political and Institutional Issues in Congestion Pricing
Lee W. Munnich, Jr. Since 1994, a small group of Minnesota transportation planners, academics, and consultants has studied congestion pricing as a potential tool for managing congestion and financing transportation in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. This is the fifth in a series of papers about Minnesota's experience and continued exploration of congestion pricing (1) (2) (3) (4) . Despite several unsuccessful attempts to implement a pilot project in the 1990s, the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Minnesota DOT) and the University of Minnesota's Hubert H. Humphrey Institute led an ongoing public process to examine the potential for congestion pricing applications. International examples of congestion pricing through cordon schemes include Singapore, London, and Stockholm, Sweden. These efforts have led to significant congestion reduction as well as modal shifts from automobiles to transit. In the United States, congestion pricing has followed a different pattern, with high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes being the preferred approach. HOT or express lane projects in San Diego and Orange County, California; Houston, Texas; Minneapolis; and Denver, Colorado, have used variable pricing to make more efficient use of high-occupancy vehicle lanes, offering a new option for drivers to avoid congestion for a fee, while preserving the time advantage for transit and carpools using the lane. These options have proved successful and even popular. Yet the expansion of congestion pricing beyond these limited projects has been a challenge for local transportation planners, with each project requiring considerable education and outreach as well as courageous political and institutional leaders who are willing to tackle the public debate that inevitably surrounds this new approach.
The UPA program raised the stakes significantly, offering substantial monetary incentives for those metropolitan areas that were willing to take up the challenge. Although USDOT 
MINNESOTA'S UPA PROPOSAL
Minnesota has a long and interesting history with congestion pricing. During the 1990s Minnesota DOT, together with the Metropolitan Council and the University of Minnesota's Humphrey Institute, undertook studies to determine how and whether congestion pricing could be implemented in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Early efforts to implement a congestion pricing project ran into political problems, and some political and transportation policy leaders were ready to give up on the idea. In 2004 Minnesota DOT commissioned a MnPASS system study to examine the potential for the MnPASS approach to be expanded to other parts of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan region (7 ) . Although the study, completed in 2005, affirmed the benefit of MnPASS lanes in providing a congestion-free alternative, the study also showed that the revenue from HOT lanes would pay only a fraction of the costs of converting to a HOT lane system. Furthermore, if HOT lanes are allowed to be added only at locations where expansions are planned and are not allowed to be implemented on existing free lanes (which is regarded by many as politically impossible), the congestion benefits as well as the revenue-raising potential of HOT lanes are greatly diminished. Furthermore, transportation leaders are very sensitive about changing any commitments that have already been made to complete projects in the short term (5-10 years) and adding HOT lanes to the mix. Nonetheless, Minnesota DOT had already decided to begin a process to engage the community in studying the potential for HOT lanes on I-35W south of Minneapolis before the UPA process was announced by USDOT.
Minnesota DOT made an early decision in late 2006 to seek funding for a project under the UPA program. Minnesota DOT project leaders were designated, and an interagency team was assembled, including the Metropolitan Council (the metropolitan planning organization as well as the operator of the Metro Transit system), key city 
INVOLVEMENT OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS
Given the short time frame for developing and submitting a proposal, it was important to engage stakeholders in a timely manner to ensure that key players were informed and involved and that there would be political and institutional support for the proposal when it was submitted. While some of the key organizations were represented on the project steering committee, it was important to engage other stakeholders as well as political leaders who would be important to ensure political and legislative support for the proposal. A half-day stakeholder workshop was organized in March 2007, and a broad base of potential stakeholders was invited. More than 60 stakeholders attended this workshop, which focused on alternatives in four subregions in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Candidate corridors were proposed by Minnesota DOT staff, and stakeholders discussed the pros and cons of each corridor and the potential for meeting the UPA criteria and time frame. Through this workshop and subsequent discussions with Minnesota DOT leadership and staff, the steering committee, and key stakeholders, the I-35W corridor emerged as the best prospect for the UPA proposal ( Figure 2 ). Minnesota DOT staff also introduced an innovation-priced dynamic shoulder lanes-which offered the potential of using shoulder lanes during peak periods to make more efficient use of existing capacity and combining this approach with congestion pricing. Minnesota DOT and the Metropolitan Council have had extensive experience with bus-only shoulder lanes as a way of moving buses through congested areas. The priced dynamic shoulder approach would build on this experience and test a broader application of the use of shoulders in managing congestion.
ISSUES
While Minnesota transportation and policy leaders had been exploring the next phase of MnPASS on I-394 and in other parts of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, the UPA application process accelerated and enhanced that discussion and engaged a broader set of stakeholders than had been previously involved. A number of issues arose that had to be addressed or confronted for the UPA proposal to move forward. The following is a summary of some key issues.
Tolling Versus Congestion Pricing
Minnesota has no toll roads other than the I-394 MnPASS priced lane, and many legislators and policy leaders oppose using tolling as an alternative to funding transportation projects. Furthermore, many legislators are skeptical of public-private partnerships or approaches that might lead to privatization of roads. Although the governor and key legislators initiated a study of a mileage-based fee as a possible replacement of the gas tax in the future, there has been no political support for the use of tolling to finance the system beyond congestion pricing to manage congestion. Although this initially led to some confusion, legislators opposed to tolling expressed their support for congestion pricing as a congestion management tool, in particular, when combined with transit improvements using a HOT lane approach. The terms used can be important. In fact, one advocate suggested using the term "free-flow pricing" as a better way of conveying the benefits of congestion pricing.
Antitolling Bill
In 2006 the Minnesota State House of Representatives passed a bill to limit the use of tolling, repealing earlier provisions in Minnesota law that set out the process for implementing tolling projects in the state. The bill would have excluded the current I-394 MnPASS project but could have affected other future congestion pricing projects. The legislature did not pass a transportation bill that year, and the antitolling bill died. Although the bill was introduced again in 2007, the UPA process gave advocates the opportunity to explain the differences between congestion pricing and other tolling approaches. Furthermore, key legislators recognized that the anti-tolling bill could send mixed signals to USDOT and made sure that the bill did not end up in the transportation bill that was ultimately passed. In fact, the governor and chairs of the House and Senate Transportation Committees sent a letter to USDOT indicating they would pass whatever legislation was necessary to implement the congestion pricing elements of the UPA proposal.
Shoulder-to-Shoulder Tolling
From the beginning of the UPA proposal discussions, Minnesota DOT leadership made it clear that Governor Pawlenty and Lt. Governor and Transportation Commissioner Carol Molnau would not support shoulder-to-shoulder tolling. Some congestion pricing advocates felt that this option should not be taken off the table and should be considered with other options. There were some lively debates of this issue among those involved in developing the proposal, but this was not something the Pawlenty administration was willing to consider for the UPA proposal.
Pricing Existing Capacity-Take Away or Give Back?
A related but separate issue was whether congestion pricing could be applied to existing so-called "free" capacity, that is, roads that are not currently tolled, or should be applied only with an expansion of capacity. Throughout the United States, this has been the third rail for congestion pricing. The common wisdom has been that the public might be willing to accept congestion pricing if it applied to new road capacity but would resist any taking away of existing capacity that had previously been free, or not tolled. HOV adaptations to HOT lanes, such as the I-394 MnPASS project, have been viewed as acceptable to the public because they toll the excess capacity that is not being used by carpoolers and transit users and was previously not available to single-occupant vehicles.
In fact, the crafters of the UPA process at USDOT were most interested in congestion pricing projects that did price existing capacity as a way of demonstrating how congestion pricing can be used to recover lost capacity and reduce congestion in urban areas. They argued that the success of HOV adaptations to HOT lanes had already been proved and that what needs to be demonstrated in the United States is how congestion pricing could improve the efficiency of existing capacity and lead to significant congestion reduction. The USDOT leaders pointed to London and Stockholm as recent examples that demonstrate how bolder approaches can work. London implemented congestion pricing in its downtown area in 2003 and expanded the area in 2007. Stockholm implemented a downtown cordon pricing demonstration in 2006, and after a successful referendum, the government decided to make congestion pricing permanent in 2007. In both London and Stockholm, the public opposed congestion pricing before it was implemented on existing free road capacity in the downtown areas. However, in both cities, as soon as congestion pricing was implemented, there was a significant reduction in congestion, as well as a modal shift to transit. Local public opinion then shifted dramatically in favor of the congestion pricing scheme. USDOT leaders hoped that congestion pricing could be demonstrated in the same way in the United States and were willing to offer significant funding for transit and other improvements to cities that accepted the challenge.
Changing Plans
Minnesota, as well as other states, has an elaborate system of planning for future roadway improvements and construction. With limited funding available for highway projects that are being sought throughout the state, Minnesota DOT and Metro Council planners have worked with cities, counties, and community groups to develop a balanced and equitable plan that will meet the most urgent priorities and phase in other projects as funding becomes available. The UPA funding possibility complicates this planning process by advancing certain projects and disrupting complicated arrangements that have been worked out with community and political leaders. Furthermore, the UPA match requirement ($50 million in the case of Minnesota) meant that scarce state transportation dollars must be diverted from other projects to meet the federal match. Although Minnesota DOT leadership concluded that the benefits of UPA funding were worth going after a grant, some department engineers were not convinced that the UPA funding was a bargain for the state.
Pricing During Construction
In 2007 Minnesota DOT started the reconstruction of the I-35W/ Highway 62 Crosstown Common section in south Minneapolis and adjacent suburbs. An earlier task force on congestion pricing had suggested that congestion pricing be used during the multiyear construction of the Crosstown to manage traffic flow and ensure that transit could move through the section during construction. The earlier proposal was rejected by Minnesota DOT as too complicated. Because of financing delays the Crosstown project was not started until spring 2007. Some of those involved in the Minnesota UPA discussions (including this author) felt that this was a good time to reconsider congestion pricing in the Crosstown Commons during construction, even as a 6-month to 1-year trial. This, of course, would require "shoulder-to-shoulder pricing" (or "J-barrier to J-barrier pricing," as one engineer said), which had already been eliminated by the administration and continued to be opposed as too complicated and technically not feasible by Minnesota DOT engineers.
Taxes
The battle over how to fund transportation reached a fever pitch during the 2007 Minnesota legislative session. The Minnesota House and Senate, controlled by Democrats, passed bills increasing the gas tax to fund roads and authorizing a sales tax referendum to fund transit. The governor, a Republican, vetoed the transportation funding bill, and the legislature was not able to override the veto, leaving the transportation funding issue unresolved during 2007. Although the political debate and maneuvering complicated the UPA proposal process, it did not prevent bipartisan support for the UPA process and a $1 million state appropriation to support Minnesota's UPA process. Furthermore, the governor and chairs of the House and Senate transportation committees signed a joint letter promising to pass any needed legislation for the UPA project to move forward during the 2008 legislative session.
Advocacy and Joint-Powers Groups
Two new advocacy groups emerged as proponents for congestion pricing and the UPA proposal. The first was the Citizens League, an influential nonpartisan think tank and public policy advocacy group. The membership organization has a long history of developing forward-thinking public policy solutions and advocating those changes through the legislative process. The Citizens League produced a report on transportation finance in 2005 that advocated pricing as a more transparent way of connecting transportation costs and benefits (8) . The Citizens League organized a Road Pricing Summit in February 2007, together with the University of Minnesota. This summit became an important forum for discussion of the UPA proposal. The Citizens League legislative staff played an important role in enlisting legislative support for the UPA proposal.
A second advocacy group that became involved in the UPA process was the I-35W Solutions Alliance. This joint-powers organization is made up of elected officials from cities and counties along the I-35W corridor from downtown Minneapolis through southern suburbs. This group has worked to find a common solution to address highway capacity and transit needs in the I-35W corridor. Mayors, city council members, and county commissioners quickly saw the benefits of the UPA proposal for funding transit improvements in the corridor and strongly encouraged Minnesota DOT to select the entire south I-35W corridor as the focus of the Minnesota UPA proposal. The preexistence of a joint-powers board, in which elected officials and professional staff are able to come together for purposes of advocacy and ongoing education on transportation issues, as well as the competition among these organizations, was a significant factor in Minnesota's ability to quickly mobilize local support for the UPA program. The support of this community alliance demonstrates strong political support for the Minnesota project and an important component for future success.
Openness to Alternatives
One challenge faced by the steering committee during the development of the Minnesota UPA proposal was what options could be considered to be on the table. Although SRF, the consulting firm preparing the proposal, had generated a wide range of alternatives for consideration, many of these were removed as a result of political, technical, and funding constraints. At one point so many alternatives had been eliminated from consideration that there were no viable options that could be considered competitive within the UPA process. Fortunately, some of the major options were reintroduced after further consideration and involvement of local government leaders, which resulted in a more competitive proposal for the I-35W corridor.
I-35W Bridge Collapse
The draft of this paper was submitted to TRB on August 1, 2007, before it was known whether Minnesota had been selected for a UPA grant. Shortly after 6 p.m. that same day, the I-35W bridge crossing the Mississippi River in downtown Minneapolis collapsed. Some might wonder whether the bridge collapse had any impact on Minnesota receiving a UPA award. The answer is no. The UPA decision was made before the bridge collapsed, although some of the funding has been directed to transit solutions on I-35W north of downtown Minneapolis to help deal with congestion problems resulting from the bridge collapse. However, the bridge collapse has focused Minnesota political leaders, in particular, the governor and mayor of Minneapolis, on transportation issues in a very intensive manner. Minnesota's UPA funding was enthusiastically embraced in public announcements by Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty and Minneapolis Mayor R. T. Rybak as a positive counterpoint to the tragedy of the bridge collapse. Although the bridge collapse has vastly overshadowed Minnesota's UPA award in the media and public attention, it has increased the importance of transportation policy in the public arena and raised public expectations for transportation solutions. This should enhance the importance of the UPA project to Minnesota.
LESSONS LEARNED
A number of lessons can be learned from Minnesota's experience in developing its UPA proposal. These lessons are likely to apply in other metropolitan regions as well.
1. Outreach and education about congestion pricing needs to be ongoing. Ongoing outreach and education is critical for congestion pricing efforts. Minnesota's past experience in developing the I-394 MnPASS project demonstrated the importance of outreach and education before and during project development. The road pricing summit and two stakeholder workshops were important in broadening and deepening the base of support for a UPA proposal with a strong congestion pricing component. One-on-one and small group meetings with legislators, city and county elected officials, and transportation policy leaders were also critical in building leadership support. Minnesota DOT staff engaged in metropolitan regional projects also needed to learn more about how congestion pricing could apply to current projects and work with other strategies to reduce congestion.
2. The UPA process broadened the base of stakeholders who support congestion pricing. The USDOT UPA process played an important role in broadening the base of stakeholders who would consider congestion pricing as a realistic solution to reduce congestion in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Although those who use the I-394 corridor could see how dynamic pricing works on a daily basis to offer an alternative to getting stuck in congestion, the success of the I-394 MnPASS project did not necessarily transfer to support for congestion pricing in other corridors. The UPA process helped political leaders understand how congestion pricing and transit improvements can work together to reduce congestion and generated a broad base of leadership support in the I-35W corridor that did not exist before the UPA process began.
3. Political leaders are prepared to take risks if the project makes sense. Mayors, city council members, county commissioners, and legislators have lined up to support the Minnesota UPA proposal for I-35W. Although many of these elected officials are still skeptical of a broader use of tolling, they understand how congestion pricing can work with transit improvements to reduce congestion and encourage a modal shift to transit.
4. Public advocacy and joint-powers groups can play a key role in promoting congestion pricing. State DOTs have been reluctant to publicly advocate congestion pricing. Although Minnesota DOT has supported outreach and education activities through the University of Minnesota, department leaders have been cautious about advocating congestion pricing without a broader base of political support. Advocacy groups such as the Citizens League and joint-powers groups such as the I-35W Solutions Alliance are important in building legislative and broader political support and bringing other organizations on board.
5. Institutional collaboration is critical for a successful congestion pricing project. Agencies may feel the need to control the decisionmaking process lest they get caught up in commitments that are difficult to fulfill. The natural tendencies for bureaucracies to move slowly and the difficulty in gaining political will can be major obstacles for the submission of robust and ground-breaking proposals. An approach to the submission of substantive proposals that is inclusive, involving interagency representation and advocacy groups, can help to increase the breadth and depth of support for innovative solutions to congestion.
6. Strong technical support is critical in developing successful congestion pricing projects. Minnesota was able to develop a strong technical proposal because of an effective leadership team from Minnesota DOT's Office of Traffic, Safety and Operations, including the Regional Traffic Management Center, who were tapped to lead the Minnesota UPA effort. Minnesota DOT had just completed a congestion management study that provided a number of short-term solutions for addressing congestion problems in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. This study helped lay the groundwork for the UPA proposal. SRF, a local engineering consultant that has been engaged in past congestion pricing studies and the I-394 MnPASS project, was hired to assist Minnesota DOT in developing a strong technical proposal.
7. Options should not be limited because of political concerns. The experiences in London and Stockholm indicate that congestion pricing will always be controversial until the public sees it work. Being overcautious because of political concerns could mean that a region might miss a significant opportunity to use congestion pricing to actually reduce congestion. Alternatives should not be limited for strictly political reasons. If the project makes sense and will work, the political support will follow.
8. Comprehensive monitoring and evaluation are essential for assessing the impacts of congestion pricing projects. The USDOT and Minnesota DOT are planning comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of the Minnesota UPA project to fully understand the combined impacts of congestion pricing, transit improvements, telecommuting promotion, and technology solutions. What is the overall impact on congestion in the corridor? What types of modal shifts occur between drivers and transit riders? Does telecommuting have an impact? How are adjacent roads affected? What are the equity impacts of these changes? These are just some of the questions to be answered through this evaluation.
CONCLUSION
USDOT's Urban Partnership Agreement competition has generated increasing interest in congestion pricing nationwide with the offer of significant federal funding for transit and other improvements when combined with pricing to reduce congestion. The Minnesota UPA process has led to an increased interest in congestion pricing as a congestion management tool in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area and has generated a broader base of support among political leaders for congestion pricing when combined with transit improvements.
